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Abstract 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to empirically investigate firms’ motives to patent in general, and more specifically 
how some of these motives depend upon firms’ technology strategies and especially their level of open 
innovation. 
Design/methodology/approach 
The paper is based on a questionnaire survey sent to CTOs (or equivalent) of the largest R&D spenders among 
Swedish large firms (e.g., ABB, AstraZeneca, Ericsson, and Volvo) and among Swedish small and medium-
sized enterprises. Principal component analysis and multiple linear regressions were used to check the impact 
from open innovation upon the importance of 21 different motives to patent, with a specific focus on protection 
and bargaining related motives. 
Findings 
The most important motive to patent is to protect product technologies, but protecting freedom to operate is 
almost as important, followed by a number of other motives.  Increasing importance of open innovation in firms 
is related to stronger bargaining motives to patent, and even stronger protection motives. In fact, when 
comparing with closed innovation the results show that open innovation is more strongly positively related with 
all different motives to patent except for one (to attract customers). This indicates that firms find it more 
important to patent when engaged in open innovation than when engaged in closed innovation. 
Originality/value 
The paper reports results from the first study that links patenting motives to technology strategies. It contributes 
to an emerging stream of empirical studies investigating the role of patents in external technology strategies 
and open innovation, showing that the motives to patent are strengthened within open innovation settings.  
Keywords: Patent management; motives to patent; technology strategy; innovation; intellectual property management; open 
innovation 
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1 Introduction 
Society’s dominant motive for having a patent system is to improve the provision 
of innovations by offering inventors temporary, transferable rights to protect their 
inventions from imitation enough for capturing or appropriating sufficient returns 
from their inventions to pay back for their R&D in return for enabling disclosure of 
the inventions. Since the dawn of the pro-patent era in the 1980s the attention to 
patenting among firms has increased (Bhaskarabhatla and Hegde, 2014, 
Granstrand, 1999), and patenting decisions are now increasingly perceived as 
important strategic considerations. Firms do no longer patent only to prevent 
imitation, but they have several other motives to patent, such as to obtain bargaining 
power or to improve the corporate image (e.g., Arundel et al., 1995, Cohen et al., 
2000, Duguet and Kabla, 1998, Holgersson, 2013, Mihm et al., 2015), and there has  
been a surge, or even explosion, in patenting (Hall, 2004, Hu and Jefferson, 2009, 
Kortum and Lerner, 1998). 
A parallel trend has been the increasing attention to and use of various forms of 
external technology strategies, or in other terms open innovation (Chesbrough, 
2003b). While patenting may seem contradictory to open innovation, several 
scholars have pointed at the enabling role of patents for such interorganizational 
innovation processes (e.g., Chesbrough, 2003a, Granstrand, 2006, Merges, 2011) 
and for various forms of technology trade (e.g., Arora et al., 2001, Arrow, 1962, de 
Rassenfosse et al., 2016, Tietze, 2012). Much recent research has also pointed at 
the importance of integrating patent strategy with firm strategy in general and 
technology strategy more specifically. For example, Alexy et al. (2009) argue that 
there needs to be an alignment between the engagement in open innovation and 
firms’ patent strategies, Manzini and Lazzarotti (2015) point at the different roles 
various intellectual property rights (IPRs) can play throughout an open innovation 
process, and Henkel et al. (2013), Bogers (2011), Granstrand and Holgersson 
(2014), and Holgersson (2012) in various ways emphasize the roles patents can play 
to control and govern interorganizational technology strategies. However, the 
patent system has also received increasing criticism for being overused and misused 
by various actors (Burk and Lemley, 2009, Jaffe and Lerner, 2004), and especially 
for disabling cumulative innovation across firm boundaries (Bessen and Meurer, 
2008, Boldrin and Levine, 2008, 2013, Brüggemann et al., 2016). 
Given these developments, there is a need to understand the multifaceted motive 
structure underlying the decision to patent, and how firms’ technology strategies 
impact the importance of various motives. Our purpose is therefore to empirically 
investigate firms’ motives to patent in general, and more specifically how some of 
these patenting motives depend upon the firms’ technology strategies and especially 
their level of open/closed innovation. 
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2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
There is a relatively rich literature on motives to patent, and the first section below 
describes how that literature has been used to identify the motives studied here. The 
section on technology strategies and motives to patent will then develop hypotheses 
related to the relationship between technology strategies and some of these motives 
to patent. 
2.1 Motives to patent 
A number of studies have been carried out of the motives (or advantages or 
rationales) behind firms’ decisions to patent, see for example Holgersson (2013) 
and Mihm et al. (2015) for reviews. As patents fulfill several functions in the 
economy a plurality of motives to patent can be expected. For example, early 
studies of patenting motives included to prevent imitation, to avoid litigation, to 
improve technology negotiation, to enable licensing, and to reward researchers 
(e.g., Arundel et al., 1995, Duguet and Kabla, 1998). Subsequent studies have 
included additional motives, such as to block competitors from certain 
technological areas (Blind et al., 2006, Cohen et al., 2000, Granstrand, 1999), to 
improve reputation (Blind et al., 2006, Cohen et al., 2000, Thumm, 2004), and to 
attract capital (Granstrand and Holgersson, 2012, Holgersson, 2013, Keupp et al., 
2009, de Rassenfosse, 2012). In this study the latter two motives are subdivided 
relating to different stakeholders and capital types, respectively. Another important 
motive for firms to patent is to safeguard their freedom to operate (FTO). Patenting 
an invention leads to a published patent publication that contributes to prior art. 
This in turn means that other actors cannot patent that same invention and the patent 
holder can therefore not be excluded from using its own invention. While this 
motive has not been explicitly covered by most previous studies, it likely plays an 
important role in the decision to patent (Granstrand, 1999, Holgersson and Wallin, 
2017) and it is therefore included here.  
In total we include 21 pre-formulated patenting motives (see Table 3). The motives 
are grouped into motives for a) protection, b) bargaining, c) improving corporate 
image, d) attracting external financing, and e) internal motives. This grouping is an 
extension of the grouping of 10 motives into motives for a) protection, b) 
bargaining, c) improving corporate image, and d) internal advantages in Granstrand 
(1999), here adding the group of external financing motives. Blind et al. (2006), 
using factor analysis, identified five groups of motives: a) protection, b) blockade, 
c) exchange, d) reputation, and e) incentive. At closer scrutiny the latter five groups 
identified ex post by Blind et al. (2006) are by and large aligned with the five groups 
of motives identified ex ante in this study except for the blockade group in the Blind 
et al. study (grouped with protection motives here) and the external financing 
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motive group in this study (grouped with exchange/bargaining motives by Blind et 
al.). 
2.2 Technology strategies and motives to patent 
Firms may acquire and commercialize technologies through internal R&D and in-
house production and marketing of products and services. However, there are also 
many alternatives to this type of internal technology acquisition and 
commercialization. Firms may for example buy or sell licenses (Granstrand, 2004) 
or in other ways trade technologies on various technology markets (Arora et al., 
2001), for example through patent auctions (Tietze, 2012). Firms may also engage 
in various forms of organizational setups with various degrees of organizational 
disintegration in which technologies are acquired and/or commercialized, for 
example through partnerships, joint ventures, and spin-offs (Granstrand and 
Sjölander, 1990). All these different types of external technology strategies are 
sometimes viewed as different forms of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003b), and 
more specifically different forms of inbound or outbound open innovation (Enkel 
et al., 2009, Dahlander and Gann, 2010). 
We here use a typology of technology procurement (inbound) and technology 
exploitation (outbound) strategies originally introduced by Granstrand (1982) with 
different types of technology strategies ranging from fully vertically integrated ones 
over quasi-integrated ones to disintegrated ones in a transaction cost framework 
(Williamson, 1975). This framework was subsequently refined in several research 
studies. Granstrand and Sjölander (1990) embedded the strategies in a multi-
technology context and Granstrand et al. (1992) related the typology to the theory 
of incomplete contracts and created an index as an operationalization of 
organizational integration, or in other terms of inbound and outbound openness in 
innovation, based on the length and strength (binding) of the contractual relations 
associated with each strategy type, ranging from the use of full employment 
contracts to the use of spot market contracts and contract free exchange.1 The 
typology is thus based on the different types of contractual relations involved, 
which is in line with the view of the technology based firm as a nexus of technology 
related contracts.  
On the acquisition/inbound side the typology, which is illustrated in Figure 1, 
includes a) in-house R&D, and various forms of external acquisition, such as b) 
acquisition of innovative firms (or business units), c) joint ventures and other forms 
of collaborative R&D, d) technology in-licensing, and e) other forms of technology 
                                                 
 
1 See Granstrand et al. (1997) and Granstrand (1999) for additional empirical use of the typology 
and Granstrand (1998) for further theorizing about the technology based firm. 
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purchasing (e.g., contract R&D). On the commercialization/outbound side the 
typology analogously includes a) internal exploitation (i.e. with integrated 
production and/or marketing and sales of technology-based products and services), 
b) creation of innovative firms (units, spin-offs), c) joint ventures and 
collaborations, d) technology out-licensing, and e) other forms of technology sales 
(e.g., contract R&D). Aside from the in-house R&D and internal exploitation 
strategies, these strategies comprise different forms of open innovation 
(Chesbrough, 2003b). The typology also includes other forms of technology 
acquisition and exploitation, such as technology scanning, leakage, and loss (cf., 
Granstrand et al., 1992), but they are not included in our analysis here.  
 
 
Figure 1 Typology of technology acquisition and commercialization strategies or in other terms different 
modes of inbound and outbound closed/open innovation (adapted from Granstrand, 1982, and 
Granstrand et al., 1992) 
 
Previous research has pointed at various ways in which patents may function to 
enable open innovation, even though there is also literature questioning whether 
patents enable or inhibit collaborative R&D (e.g., Alexy et al., 2009, von Hippel, 
2005). While our study includes several individual motives across five groups, there 
are especially two groups of motives that seem to be related to open innovation 
according to previous literature, namely protection and bargaining motives, and 
below we develop hypotheses about these relationships. 
First, protection motives include protection of product and process technologies, 
creation of retaliatory power, blocking competitors from certain technology areas, 
and securing FTO. Several scholars argue that patents may disable knowledge flows 
and cumulative innovation (Brüggemann et al., 2016), and that when engaged in 
open innovation, innovators should refrain from protecting their innovations and 
rather freely reveal them (e.g., Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011, von Hippel and von 
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base (Capability 
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technology scanning
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Krogh, 2006). One argument is that innovators who freely share their contributions 
can in exchange get access to a full design for only a small share of the total design 
cost, and that freely revealing is therefore a rational choice among non-competitors 
(Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011). Additionally, firms employing strict patent 
protection may decrease the amount of complementary inventions developed by 
other firms (Bhaskarabhatla and Hegde, 2014). 
However, even when benefiting from freely revealing some of their inventions, 
innovators may still benefit from patenting other inventions, employing a selective 
revealing strategy (Henkel, 2006) which may be especially useful for modular 
products (Baldwin and Henkel, 2015, Henkel et al., 2013). In addition, much 
research points at the important function of patents even for innovations that are 
shared across firms boundaries (Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006, de Rassenfosse et al., 
2016, West, 2006). In such situations there are less possibilities to rely on other 
protection mechanisms, such as secrecy (e.g., Arundel, 2001) or control of 
complementary assets (Teece, 1986). In addition, the technology is more at risk to 
imitation or substitution threats when it is exposed to technology markets or to 
collaboration partners (Foss et al., 2010, Granstrand and Holgersson, 2014, Pisano 
and Teece, 2007, Veer et al., 2016), again increasing the need for patent protection. 
Not only protection of the focal technology may be of importance. When a firm 
shares or sells knowledge and technologies, the probability that collaborators would 
walk into a similar technological pathway increases, in turn increasing the risks for 
the firm of being blocked by its collaborators’ future patents (Granstrand and 
Holgersson, 2014).2 This would increase the importance of patenting to block 
competitors or collaborators from certain technology areas, to create retaliatory 
power, and to secure FTO. All of these motives are included in our group of 
protection motives, and we hypothesize that their importance is positively related 
with the importance of open innovation strategies. 
H1: The importance of protection motives is positively related with the importance 
of open innovation strategies. 
Second, bargaining motives include increasing licensing and cross-licensing 
possibilities, facilitating R&D collaborations, and improving bargaining position in 
standard-setting. Ever since the seminal work by Arrow (1962) the need for patents 
to enable technology trade has been accepted in theory. The argument is that patents 
enable codified disclosure of technologies (de Rassenfosse et al., 2016, Zobel et al., 
2016) and facilitate technology trade or collaboration (Blind et al., 2006, Bogers, 
                                                 
 
2 This relates to the concepts of sideground and postground knowledge/technology/IP (Granstrand 
and Holgersson, 2014). 
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2011, Chesbrough, 2003a). In these situations the contractual underpinnings created 
by patents are useful for governing collaboration and trade (Granstrand and 
Holgersson, 2013, Hagedoorn and Zobel, 2015, Merges, 2011). The perceivable 
benefits are thus not only related to possibilities of selling licenses. Patents might 
give better possibilities to access outside technologies through cross-licensing, they 
might facilitate R&D collaborations with others, and they might give a better 
bargaining position in collaborative standard-setting. All these are different 
individual motives that we group as bargaining motives, and we again hypothesize 
that their importance is positively related with the importance of open innovation 
strategies. 
H2: The importance of bargaining motives is positively related with the importance 
of open innovation strategies. 
3 Method 
3.1 Sampling 
We sent the questionnaire to the 100 largest R&D spenders (in terms of yearly R&D 
expenses) among Swedish national and binational large firms as well as to the 100 
largest R&D spenders among Swedish SMEs. R&D data was collected from three 
different sources. In addition to data from financial records (which is incomplete in 
terms of R&D expenditures), data was collected from listings of top R&D investors 
in the EU (The 2010 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard) as well as from 
listings of top R&D spenders in the Swedish technology newspaper NyTeknik. 
Additional company data was collected from the Swedish company database 
Retriever Business and from annual reports. 
Questionnaire data was collected via paper and internet-based surveys during late 
2011 and early 2012. 57% of the large firms and 34% of the SMEs responded. The 
total response rate was thus 46%3, and non-respondents were fairly evenly 
distributed across different levels of R&D spending. The respondents (large firms; 
SMEs) were distributed across several industries, including chemistry, 
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals (12%; 13%), electronics, IT, power (20%; 15%), 
mechanical (18%; 7%), and other industries (13%; 2%). Even though the sample is 
relatively small, the tail sampling technique (sampling the largest R&D spenders) 
enables us to cover a large share of the Swedish corporate R&D. Needless to say, 
R&D expenditures are heavily skewed, with most corporate R&D being carried out 
in a few large technology-based companies. In the case of Sweden these include 
                                                 
 
3 For some firms there are missing data on specific questions. 
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firms such as Volvo, Ericsson, ABB, AstraZeneca, etc. By focusing on 200 of the 
largest R&D spenders, we ensured that we were able to receive responses from the 
right person within the right firms with a high response rate.4 By including two 
different subsamples of the largest R&D spenders, large firms and SMEs, we were 
able to include firms across most sizes, despite the fact that most R&D expenditures 
in absolute terms are made by large firms.  
Nevertheless, small samples need to be treated with care. In this case no statistical 
generalization can be made outside the population of the largest R&D spenders 
among Swedish large firms and SMEs, even though we see no reason to believe 
that our results would differ from studies of firms in other countries with similar 
characteristics. 
We made direct contacts with the highest relevant position at each company. The 
questionnaire was typically sent to the person holding the chief technology officer 
(CTO), VP R&D, head of R&D, or similar position, at each company. Almost all 
the responses were also given by the intended respondents, with very few 
exceptions where the questionnaire had trickled down to for example patent 
managers. 
3.2 Variables 
The technology strategies of the studied firms are investigated by a set of questions 
inspired by previous research as discussed above. Various strategies are measured 
with 5-point interval scales (1-5) ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very 
important). These relate to strategies with various degrees of organizational 
integration. In this study we focus on three main strategies for acquiring 
technologies and three main strategies for commercializing (exploiting) 
technologies.  
The first strategy for acquiring technologies is internal R&D, which is measured by 
a single item in the questionnaire. The second strategy is what we call inbound 
organizational extension, which is measured as the maximum value of two different 
items, including acquisition of innovative firms (or business units) and joint 
ventures and other forms of collaborative R&D. This strategy relates to various 
ways of expanding the organizational boundary of the firm to include additional 
technology or R&D. The third and final strategy for acquiring technologies is what 
we call inbound technological extension, which is again measured as the maximum 
value of two different items, including purchasing of licenses and other forms of 
                                                 
 
4 Broader and larger sampling would have led to a greater number of responses, at the expense of a 
decreasing response rate among the firms we wanted to focus on, i.e. the largest R&D spenders. 
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technology purchasing, such as contract R&D. This strategy relates to various ways 
of purchasing technologies from outside stakeholders. Maximum values are 
preferred over average values in the two latter technology commercialization 
strategies, since one firm might focus on only one out of two items, and averaging 
the two would downplay the importance too much.  
The strategies for exploiting or commercializing technologies and the strategies for 
acquiring or sourcing them correspond one-to-one to each other in that each type of 
contract links the exploiting party to the acquiring party on a market. The first 
technology commercialization strategy is internal exploitation through direct 
investments in production and/or marketing and sales of technology-based products 
and services. The second strategy is outbound organizational extension, measured 
as the maximum of creation of innovative firms (units, spin-offs) and joint ventures. 
The third strategy is outbound technological extension, measured as the maximum 
of sales of technology licenses and other forms of technology sales (such as 
performing contract R&D). 
The different motives to patent are also measured with 5-point interval scales (1-5) 
ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very important). The two groups of 
motives of main interest here are then measured as scales, each one averaging the 
values over several interval items. These motive groups are “for protection” and 
“for bargaining”. They consist of five and four items, respectively (see question 
structure in Table 3, which includes the full list of various motives). 
Apart from the above independent and dependent variables we include a number of 
control variables. Firm size is included as a dummy variable being 1 for the sample 
of large firms and 0 for the sample of SMEs. We also include the 10-logaritm of the 
total turnover as an additional control variable, since there is size variation within 
each sub-sample. Much research has pointed at SMEs’ lack of resources for 
properly benefitting from the patent system (e.g., Holgersson, 2013, Kitching and 
Blackburn, 1998), and their relatively low patent propensity (Mansfield, 1986, 
Arundel and Kabla, 1998, Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999, Chabchoub and Niosi, 
2005). Previous research has also indicated that SMEs relative to large firms put 
larger emphasis on image and financing motives (Blind et al., 2006, Conti et al., 
2013, Hoenig and Henkel, 2015, Holgersson, 2013, Holgersson et al., 2016, de 
Rassenfosse, 2012). Apart from firm size, the level of intellectual property (IP) 
organization in some sense could impact the motives that firms have to patent, since 
a firm with a more developed IP organization can probably utilize the patent system 
better and in more ways than a firm with a less developed IP organization (e.g., 
Granstrand and Holgersson, 2012). This variable is measured as the sum of positive 
answers to questions about the firms having 1) a central patent department, 2) a 
patent/IP manager, and 3) a written corporate-wide patent/IP policy. Thus, the 
variable ranges from 0 for a low level of IP organization to 3 for a high level of IP 
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organization. Finally, dummy variables are included for the four different broad 
industries, including 1) chemistry, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, 2) mechanical, 
3) electronics, IT, power, and 4) other industries. This is important since previous 
research has found large differences between industries (Holgersson, 2013, Levin 
et al., 1987, Mansfield, 1986).  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations across independent variables 
and control variables. Some observations can be made. First, size (measured by two 
different controls) is positively correlated with the level of IP organization. Second, 
size is positively correlated with inbound organizational extension, meaning that 
large firms in general make more use than SMEs of acquisition of innovative firms 
(or business units) and joint ventures and other forms of collaborative R&D. Third, 
size is negatively correlated with outbound technology extension, meaning that 
SMEs make more use than large firms of various forms of licensing and technology 
sales, in line with expectations (e.g., Granstrand, 2004). Fourth and finally, there is 
a number of significantly positive correlations across technology strategies. This 
has implications for our continued statistical analysis, which we will cover more in 
depth below. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations, independent and control variables 
 
Pearson correlation 
(significance) 
Independent variable: 
Mean  
(std. dev.) Size sample 
Size 
(LogTurnove
r) IP org ChemistryEtc 
ElectronicsEt
c 
MechanicalEt
c 
In-house 
R&D 
Inbound Org. 
Extension 
Inbound 
Tech. 
Extension 
Internal 
Exploitation 
Outbound 
Org. 
Extension  
Size sample 
.626             
(.4864)             
Size (LogTurnover) 
6.214 .783***            
(1.116) (.000)            
IP org 
1.473 .227* .250*           
(1.214) (.030) (.017)           
ChemistryEtc 
.253 -.178+ -.146 .212*          
(.437) (.091) (.169) (.043)          
ElectronicsEtc 
.352 -.097 -.182+ -.212* -.428***         
(.480) (.359) (.085) (.044) (.000)         
MechanicalEtc 
.242 .118 .182+ .055 -.328** -.416***        
(.431) (.266) (.084) (.602) (.001) (.000)        
In-house R&D 
4.453 .117 .073 .119 .078 -.041 -.020       
(.697) (.282) (.506) (.275) (.476) (.709) (.852)       
Inbound Org. Extension 
3.371 .149 .200+ .156 -.094 .062 .052 .057      
(.910) (.175) (.067) (.155) (.394) (.574) (.638) (.604)      
Inbound Tech. Extension 
2.977 -.131 -.050 .038 .063 .158 -.167 -.052 .395***     
(1.069) (.231) (.650) (.729) (.565) (.149) (.127) (.638) (.000)     
Internal Exploitation 
4.306 .062 .000 .054 .141 .065 .120 .141 .028 -.094    
(.817) (.571) (.998) (.623) (.197) (.554) (.273) (.202) (.802) (.396)    
Outbound Org. Extension 
2.565 -.140 -.077 .025 .048 -.041 -.046 -.074 .225* .072 -.145   
(1.107) (.202) (.486) (.824) (.660) (.708) (.675) (.503) (.040) (.515) (.190)   
Outbound Tech. Extension 
2.115 -.191+ -.289* .045 .013 .051 -.095 .118 .204+ .179 -.142 .429***  
1.006 (.095) (.010) (.696) (.909) (.659) (.406) (.307) (.076) (.119) (.217) (.000)  
Notes: +, *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively (2-tailed). Parentheses are presenting standard deviations for means and significance for correlations. 
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3.3 Variable reduction 
The large number of significant correlations across the six technology strategies 
leads us to believe that there could be one or several latent dimensions. Principal 
component analysis (PCA) was used to help explore such latent dimensions.5 
Factorability was examined by the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling 
adequacy (0.569), Bartlett’s test of sphericity (significant at the 0.1% level), and 
anti-image correlation matrix diagonals (all but one larger than 0.5), all in all 
indicating the usefulness of PCA (e.g., Cerny and Kaiser, 1977, Dziuban and 
Shirkey, 1974). An orthogonal factor matrix rotation (varimax) was selected, but 
the results here are robust also for oblique rotation (direct oblimin). The results from 
the PCA showed that two components have eigenvalues above 1 (indicating that 
these are the two to include according to the Kaiser criterion), and that these two 
components together explain 51% of the variance. The scree plot supports the 
selection of these two components. The resulting component matrices are presented 
in Table 2, showing factor loadings above 0.3. Our interpretation of the PCA results 
is that the first component is an open innovation component that relates to various 
external technology acquisition and commercialization strategies, while the second 
component is a closed innovation component that relates to internal technology 
acquisition and commercialization strategies. These two components resonate well 
with the purpose of the paper, and they will be used as our independent variables in 
the continued analysis.  
 
Table 2 Component matrix from factor analysis 
 
Components  Rotated components 
1 2  1 2 
Outbound Org. Extension .711   .723  
Outbound Tech. Extension .687   .697  
Inbound Org. Extension .677 .349  .674  
Inbound Tech. Extension .601   .592  
In-house R&D  .774   .765 
Internal Exploitation  .645   .681 
Notes: Coefficients with less than 0,3 factor loading are not shown. Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
 
                                                 
 
5 The statistical analysis is done in SPSS Statistics 22 throughout. 
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4 Results 
We present our empirical results here in two sections, in line with the two parts of 
the purpose. First, we present our results on firms’ motives to patent in general. 
Second, we present our results on how firms’ level of open innovation impact the 
motives to patent, especially protection and bargaining motives. 
4.1 Motives to patent 
The descriptive results show the importance of various motives for patenting, see 
Table 3 where the results have been split for the two subsamples of large firms and 
SMEs, respectively. A number of observations can be gleaned right away from 
Table 3, based on comparisons across motive groups and firm sizes. 
First, the most important motive to patent for both large firms and SMEs is to 
protect product technologies, and protection motives in general, except for process 
protection, dominate over other groups of motives. The second most important 
motive is to protect/secure FTO. As described above, FTO refers to the ability to 
produce and market products and services without infringing other actors’ IPRs and 
interestingly enough firms find that motive almost as important as to protect product 
technologies. A related motive, number three in average importance, is to block 
competitors from certain technology areas. This is related to the ability to ensure 
one’s own technological flexibility on the one hand, and the ability to hinder 
competitors’ technological advancements on the other hand (cf. Blind et al., 2006).  
Moreover, to create retaliatory power through patenting is instrumental for securing 
both FTO and technological flexibility, and this is the fourth (out of 21) strongest 
motive to patent for both large firms and SMEs.6 
Second, the corporate image group of motives comes next in importance on 
average. The specific motive to improve image towards investors is the second 
strongest motive among SMEs and significantly stronger than for large firms. 
The third group of motives is internal motives to patent. These include to motivate 
employees and to measure R&D productivity.  
Fourth, motives related to bargaining (e.g. for licensing and cross-licensing and for 
facilitating R&D collaborations) are of relatively limited importance, however in 
general more important for SMEs, especially for selling licenses. Bargaining 
motives to patent is likely becoming stronger as firms engage in external, or open, 
technology acquisition and exploitation (i.e., open innovation), requiring 
bargaining with external partners or parties on technology markets, and then 
                                                 
 
6 This is in line with the arms race model of patenting (Granstrand, 1999, Jell et al., forthcoming).  
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especially for small firms forced to or prone to use such exploitation strategies 
rather than integrating forward into production and marketing. We will return to 
this below. 
Fifth, the group of motives to patent for attracting external financing in various 
forms is in addition to bargaining a group of non-traditional motives. As a group its 
importance ranks lowest among the motive groups, while there are some interesting 
differences between firm sizes. SMEs rate motives related to attracting private 
capital significantly higher than large firms. 
4.2 Open innovation and motives to patent 
The second part of our purpose addresses the relationship between the importance 
of open innovation strategies and some of the motives to patent. More specifically, 
we hypothesize that open innovation strengthen protection (H1) as well as 
bargaining (H2) motives to patent (see above). We perform two multiple linear 
regressions to test our hypotheses.  
Table 4 presents regression results for the first hypothesis, i.e. that the importance 
of protection motives is positively related with the importance of open innovation 
strategies. The regression supports Hypothesis 1 at the 0.1% significance level. The 
coefficient is even larger for the open innovation component than for the closed 
innovation component.7 This means that increasing importance of open innovation 
strategies is related to increasing importance of patenting for protection reasons, 
which is already the strongest motive to patent in general. 
The second hypothesis states that the importance of bargaining motives is positively 
related with the importance of open innovation strategies. There was a relatively 
low importance of bargaining motives on average (see Table 3). However, the 
importance of these motives increases with increasing importance of open 
innovation strategies, see Table 5. Hypothesis 2 is supported at the 10% 
significance level. Again, the coefficient is larger for the open innovation 
component than for the closed innovation component.  
                                                 
 
7 The difference in coefficients between the open and closed innovation components is not 
significant, however, which can be tested by calculating the share of overlapping confidence 
intervals for the beta coefficients (e.g., Cumming 2009, Cumming and Finch, 2005). A larger sample 
might be needed to find significant differences across coefficients. 
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Table 3 Average importance of various motives to patent (1 = not at all important; 5 = very important) with significance of difference in means  
 All firms Large firms SMEs Significance 
For protection:     
a) i. Protecting product technology 4.09 4.17 3.97 .458 
a) ii. Protecting process technology 2.53 2.51 2.56 .860 
a) iii. Creating retaliatory power against competitors 3.37 3.30 3.48 .561 
a) iv. Blocking competitors from certain technology areas 3.50 3.57 3.40 .596 
a) v. Securing freedom to operate 3.95 4.10 3.69 .141 
For bargaining:     
b) i. Giving better possibilities of selling licenses 2.32 2.11 2.74 .050 
b) ii. Giving better possibilities of accessing technology through cross‐licensing 2.40 2.35 2.50 .617 
b) iii. Facilitating R&D collaboration with others 2.48 2.32 2.75 .148 
b) iv. Giving a better bargaining position in standard‐setting 2.44 2.26 2.81 .102 
For improving the corporate image towards:     
c) i. Employees/new recruits 2.61 2.64 2.56 .759 
c) ii. Customers 3.16 3.00 3.44 .173 
c) iii. Suppliers 2.26 2.17 2.42 .349 
c) iv. Investors 3.25 2.96 3.77 .008 
c) v. Other collaborators 2.66 2.52 2.88 .207 
c) vi. Local government(s) 2.04 2.07 2.00 .804 
For attracting external financing in form of:     
d)  i. Bank loans and similar from non‐governmental institutions without governmental 
guarantees 
2.13 1.86 2.54 .051 
d) ii. Private equity/venture capital 2.52 2.25 2.96 .065 
d) iii. Governmental loans and grants and other loans with governmental guarantees 1.78 1.71 1.90 .573 
d) iv. Governmental equity/venture capital 1.72 1.68 1.80 .697 
For internal reasons:     
e) i. Providing motivation for employees to invent 3.19 3.30 3.00 .296 
e) ii. Providing a measure of R&D productivity 2.56 2.72 2.30 .171 
Notes: 2-tailed significance from t-test for equality of means, not assuming equal variances. 
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Table 4 Regression results – protection motive 
 Dependent variable: Average protection motive  Model (4) 95% confidence 
interval for B 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)  Lower bound Upper bound 
Open innovation component (1)  
.371*** 
(.000) 
 
.358*** 
(.000) 
 
.175 .541 
Closed innovation component (2)   
.263* 
(.018) 
.241* 
(.045) 
 
.045 .436 
Size sample (Large=1 / SMEs=0) 
.385 
(.286) 
.529 
(.109) 
.185 
(.604) 
.341 
(.293) 
 
-.302 .984 
Size (LogTurnover) 
-.171 
(.277) 
-.179 
(.208) 
.185 
(.604) 
-.144 
(.294) 
 
-.416 .128 
IP organization 
.141 
(.152) 
.074 
(.408) 
.121 
(.203) 
.058 
(.500) 
 
-.113 .230 
Chemistry, Biotechnology, Pharmaceuticals 
.619 
(.121) 
.819* 
(.026) 
.428 
(.272) 
.637+ 
(.075) 
 
-.067 1.342 
Electronics, IT, Power 
.489 
(.187) 
.590+ 
(.080) 
.292 
(.423) 
.406 
(.220) 
 
-.249 1.062 
Mechanical 
.704+ 
(.059) 
.915** 
(.008) 
.528 
(.147) 
.745* 
(.027) 
 
.089 1.402 
Constant 
3.526*** 
(.000) 
3.451*** 
(.000) 
3.605*** 
(.000) 
3.526*** 
(.000) 
 
1.951 5.101 
Observations 69 69 69 69    
R2 .128 .302 .205 .366    
Adjusted R2 .043 .222 .113 .281    
Notes: Regression coefficients (unstandardized B), with significance in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 Regression results – bargaining motive 
 Dependent variable: Average bargaining motive  Model (4) 95% confidence 
interval for B 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)  Lower bound Upper bound 
Open innovation component (1)  
.218+ 
(.058) 
 
.207+ 
(.071) 
 
-.018 .431 
Closed innovation component (2)   
.182 
(.133) 
.166 
(.162) 
 
-.069 .401 
Size sample (Large=1 / SMEs=0) 
-.386 
(.321) 
-.284 
(.459) 
-.528 
(.184) 
-.419 
(.286) 
 
-1.199 .360 
Size (LogTurnover) 
.056 
(.741) 
.048 
(.770) 
.082 
(.622) 
.073 
(.656) 
 
-.254 .400 
IP organization 
.154 
(.142) 
.114 
(.276) 
.141 
(.177) 
.104 
(.318) 
 
-.103 .310 
Chemistry, Biotechnology, Pharmaceuticals 
1.106* 
(.011) 
1.209** 
(.005) 
.978* 
(.025) 
1.087* 
(.013) 
 
.242 1.931 
Electronics, IT, Power 
.865* 
(.032) 
.928* 
(.019) 
.728+ 
(.073) 
.799* 
(.047) 
 
.012 1.586 
Mechanical 
.547 
(.167) 
.672* 
(.089) 
.424 
(.288) 
.553 
(.165) 
 
-.235 1.342 
Constant 
1.321 
(.179) 
1.284 
(.182) 
1.374 
(.158) 
1.335 
(.162) 
 
-.553 3.223 
Observations 68 68 68 68    
R2 .209 .256 .239 .280    
Adjusted R2 .131 .169 .150 .182    
Notes: Regression coefficients (unstandardized B), with significance in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. 
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We can now complement these regression results with findings on two questions 
specifically asking the respondents about their perceptions of patents’ enabling role 
for two specific types of open innovation. The average results for both questions 
are significantly above 0 at the 0.1% significance level, see Figure 2. This indicates 
that the perception is that patenting new technologies typically increases 
possibilities for technology transfer and trade as well as for doing collaborative and 
joint R&D work with other firms and/or other organizations.    
 
 
Figure 2 Respondents’ agreement to statements (scale: ‐2 = completely disagree; 0 = neither disagree, 
nor agree; +2 = completely agree), average values and 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
We now allow ourselves to be a bit more explorative in our data analysis. Table 6 
presents results from 21 regressions, one for each individual motive to patent as 
dependent variable, and using the same control variables as above with both the 
open and the closed innovation component as independent variables (analogous to 
model 4 in Table 4 and 5 above). The results show positive relationships between 
open innovation and all motives to patent, and patenting motives are more strongly 
positively related with open innovation than with closed innovation for all but one 
individual motive, namely the motive to attract customers.   
-1
0
1
Patenting new technologies typically
increases possibilities for technology
transfer and technology trade
Patenting new technologies typically
increases possibilities for doing
collaborative and joint R&D work
with other firms and/or other
organizations
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Notes: +. *. **. and *** indicate significance at the 10%. 5%. 1%. and 0.1% levels. respectively. 
Table 6 Explorative analysis of (unstandardized) B coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from linear regressions (with controls as above) 
 Open innovation component (1)  Closed innovation component (2) 
 B Sig 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
 
B Sig 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
For protection:          
a) i. Protecting product technology .510*** .000 .313 .707  .330** .003 .114 .546 
a) ii. Protecting process technology .176 .205 -.099 .452  .092 .543 -.210 .395 
a) iii. Creating retaliatory power against competitors .279+ .084 -.038 .597  .271 .116 -.069 .610 
a) iv. Blocking competitors from certain technology areas .320* .021 .051 .589  .083 .567 -.205 .370 
a) v. Securing freedom to operate .500*** .000 .257 .742  .290* .029 .031 .549 
For bargaining:          
b) i. Giving better possibilities of selling licenses .161 .324 -.163 .485  .148 .365 -.177 .474 
b) ii. Giving better possibilities of accessing technology through cross‐licensing .102 .528 -.219 .423  .067 .687 -.263 .397 
b) iii. Facilitating R&D collaboration with others .418** .002 .162 .673  .243+ .074 -.025 .511 
b) iv. Giving a better bargaining position in standard‐setting .359* .040 .017 .701  -.149 .386 -.490 .192 
For improving the corporate image towards:          
c) i. Employees/new recruits .171 .198 -.092 .434  .082 .541 -.186 .351 
c) ii. Customers .084 .615 -.249 .417  .157 .360 -.184 .498 
c) iii. Suppliers .064 .596 -.177 .306  -.198 .113 -.445 .049 
c) iv. Investors .268+ .065 -.017 .554  -.038 .798 -.332 .256 
c) v. Other collaborators .264* .046 .005 .523  -.038 .772 -.304 .227 
c) vi. Local government(s) .139 .265 -.109 .388  -.328* .015 -.589 -.066 
For attracting external financing in form of:          
d)  i. Bank loans and similar from non‐governmental institutions without governmental 
guarantees 
.428* .011 .103 .753 
 
 -.256 .144 -.603 .091 
d) ii. Private equity/venture capital .356* .046 .007 .705  -0.15 .933 -.376 .345 
d) iii. Governmental loans and grants and other loans with governmental guarantees .386* .015 .079 .693  -.256+ .098 -.561 .049 
d) iv. Governmental equity/venture capital .359* .013 .081 .636  -.264+ .060 -.540 .012 
For internal reasons:          
e) i. Providing motivation for employees to invent .177 .238 -.120 .473  .093 .541 -.210 .397 
e) ii. Providing a measure of R&D productivity .383* .020 .063 .703  -.074 .661 -.409 .261 
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Apart from protection motives and bargaining motives as discussed above, 
increasing importance of open innovation strategies is most notably related to 
increasing importance of motives related to attracting external financing, and the 
difference compared to closed innovation is significant when analyzing overlaps of 
confidence intervals (e.g., Cumming, 2009, Cumming and Finch, 2005).  
In addition the explorative results show that the importance of open innovation is 
positively related to the importance of the patenting motives of attracting 
collaborators and of providing a measurement of R&D productivity, also 
significantly more than for closed innovation. It thus seems like patents as measures 
of R&D productivity is more important in open innovation settings than in closed 
ones. 
5 Concluding discussion 
This study of patent motives shows that the traditional motive to patent in order to 
protect product technology still dominates. This finding is in line with previous 
research (e.g., Arundel et al., 1995, Blind et al., 2006). However, the results also 
show that the motive to secure FTO is almost as important. Thus, even though the 
publication of patent applications is frequently referred to as an important downside 
with patenting, the resulting contribution to prior art relates to one of the most 
important motives to actually apply for a patent (cf. Holgersson and Wallin, 2017, 
Peters et al., 2013). The group of protection motives more generally (also including 
blocking competitors from certain technology areas and creating retaliatory power 
in addition to technology protection and safeguarding FTO) dominates over other 
motives (protection of process technologies being an exception). The protection 
motives are followed by image motives and then internal motives in average 
importance. These are followed by bargaining motives, including motives such as 
enabling licensing, cross-licensing, and R&D collaborations. The least important 
group of motives on average is the one related to attracting external financing, 
although the latter is significantly more important for SMEs than for large firms, 
which also goes in line with previous research (e.g., Holgersson, 2013, de 
Rassenfosse, 2012).  
The results from the statistical analysis, based on PCA and multiple linear 
regressions, support both our hypotheses, that (H1) the importance of protection 
motives and (H2) the importance of bargaining motives are positively related with 
the importance of open innovation strategies. The positive relationship between 
protection motives and open innovation is stronger than that between bargaining 
motives and open innovation. This goes somewhat in line with recent findings by 
de Rassenfosse et al. (2016), who found support for the claim that patents help 
protecting buyers against expropriation of the idea, while they did not find support 
for the claim that patents facilitate technology trade by enabling information 
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sharing. On the other hand our results contrast results by Blind et al. (2006) who 
found that the frequency of R&D cooperation only explains exchange motives, not 
protection motives. 
How come that protection in our study seems to be even more important than 
facilitation when patenting in open innovation? A number of explanations could be 
offered. First, the need for protection of the focal technology increases with the 
increasing imitation risks that open innovation entails (Veer et al., 2016). Second, 
the need for securing both FTO and technological flexibility increases as 
technologies across actors mix and converge (cf. Blind et al., 2006). Third, 
bargaining power in technology negotiations is closely related to the level of 
protection of the underlying technologies. Fourth, there are many other ways than 
patents of facilitating open innovation (Chesbrough et al., 2006), while open 
innovation limits other options than patents of protecting technology (Arundel, 
2001, Hagedoorn and Zobel, 2015). 
Our explorative statistical analysis furthermore shows that open innovation, or in 
other terms external technology strategies, is positively related to all individual 
motives to patent, and more so than closed innovation for all but one individual 
motive (attracting customers). In addition to the protection and bargaining motives 
discussed above, a notable result is the significantly larger positive relationship 
between open innovation and financing motives than between closed innovation 
and financing motives. This means that firms utilizing open innovation strategies 
find financing motives more important than firms utilizing closed innovation 
strategies. We propose two possible explanations behind this. First, firms utilizing 
open innovation might do so due to resource constraints, possibly meaning that they 
are not only in need of external technological and complementary resources but also 
of external financial resources, which in turn might force them to sell technology 
or company stock to finance their further developments. Second, firms engaged in 
open innovation might have learned how to utilize patent rights as contractual 
building blocks (e.g., Merges, 2011), and may thus be more aware than others of 
the possibilities to use that also in other settings, such as in financing, thereby 
increasing their propensity to patent on non-traditional grounds. 
This study contributes both to a long-standing research stream of patenting motives 
and to a more recent stream of empirical research that investigates the role of patents 
in open innovation, addressing the question of whether patents enable or inhibit 
open innovation. Our results, showing that increasing use of open innovation is 
related to stronger motives to patent in general, and especially stronger motives to 
patent in order to protect product technologies and to secure FTO, complement 
previous findings, showing for example that there is (at least to some extent) a 
positive relationship between the importance/use of formal appropriation 
mechanisms and various measures of openness (Freel and Robson, forthcoming, 
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Miozzo et al., 2016, Zobel et al., 2017), that new entrants with many patents engage 
in more innovation collaborations than others (Zobel et al., 2016), and that 
technological leaders are more prone than followers to increase their patenting 
when engaged in open innovation since they have more to lose from unintended 
knowledge spillovers (Arora et al., 2016). 
To summarize our results support the view of patents mainly as enablers of open 
innovation for the individual innovating firm (Arrow, 1962, Chesbrough, 2003a, 
Gans et al., 2008), rather than the opposite view of patents mainly as hinders to 
sequential and cumulative innovation across firm boundaries (Baldwin and von 
Hippel, 2011, Brüggemann et al., 2016).8 However, we have not taken a welfare 
perspective but rather focused on individual firm strategies. Even though our results 
are not indicative in terms of whether or not patents are conducive for benefits from 
open innovation on a societal level, they are clearly indicating that for the individual 
firm the motives to patent are stronger in open innovation than in closed innovation. 
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